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A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers

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Author Info
Vjollca Sadiraj
Jan Tuinstra
Frans van Winden

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Abstract

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics and interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, and increases the size of the winning set.

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Paper provided by Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series with number 2006-19.

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Length: 24
Date of creation: Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-19

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Coughlin, Peter J, 1990. " Majority Rule and Election Models," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 157-88.
  2. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2006. "On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Valentina Corradi & Antonella Ianni, . "Consensus and Co-Existence in an Interactive Process of Opinion Formation," Penn CARESS Working Papers 69d00c7ec336b2f687ab3f9c5, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kirman, Alan, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-56, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1999. "Competing for Endorsements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 501-524, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2005. "On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-08, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Zacharias Maniadis, 2009. "Campaign contributions as a commitment device," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 301-315, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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