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Interest group size dynamics and policymaking

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  • Vjollca Sadiraj

    ()

  • Jan Tuinstra
  • Frans Winden

Abstract

We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking. The model integrates ‘top-down' (policy) and `bottom-up' (individual and social-structural) influences on the development of interest groups. Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of fixed-sized interest groups can be misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can also be misleading since equilibria may be unstable. Complicated dynamics may then emerge naturally, leading to erratic time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. Our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational density reported in empirical studies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 125 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 271-303

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:271-303

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2004. "A Computational Electoral Competition Model with Social Clustering and Endogenous Interest Groups as Information Brokers," CeNDEF Working Papers 04-08, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  2. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2006. "On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 1698, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Van Winden, 2010. "Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger," CESifo Working Paper Series 3014, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2009. "Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-095/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Tuinstra, Jan & Wegener, Michael & Westerhoff, Frank, 2013. "Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic equilibrium model," BERG Working Paper Series 91, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.

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