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Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

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  • Vjollca Sadiraj
  • Jan Tuinstra
  • Frans Van Winden

Abstract

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3014.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3014

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Keywords: spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups;

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  1. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 385-406.
  2. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
  3. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 88-101, January.
  4. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
  5. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
  6. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2004. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 2006-19, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  7. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
  8. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September.
  9. Paul M. Romer, 1996. "Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America, pages 195-228 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477, October.
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