Trust, Truth, Status and Identity: an experimental inquiry
AbstractIn an experiment involving a standard trust game and a costless signalling game, it is demonstrated that economically relevant norm-based behaviors (trust, reciprocity and truth-telling) vary with social identity. The experimental procedure induced two trivial social identities. In one version, a status difference was induced. The results permitted a succinct description of identity effects: subjects held own-group members to a higher standard; and high status subjects held everyone, including themselves, to a higher standard. To illustrate the “high status/high standards” phenomenon, subjects’ “standards” were estimated from a simple identity model for a subset of the data.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) in its series EIEF Working Papers Series with number 0817.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision: Oct 2008
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-08-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-08-21 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-08-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-08-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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