Union free-riding in Britain and New Zealand
AbstractThe percentage of workers who choose not to join the union available to them at their workplace has been rising in Britain and New Zealand. Social custom, union instrumentality, the fixed costs of joining, employee perceptions of management attitudes to unionization and employee problems at work all influence the propensity to free-ride. Ideological convictions regarding the role of unions also play some role, as do private excludable goods. There is little indication of employer-inspired policies substituting for unionization where unions are already present. Having accounted for all these factors, free-riding remains more common in New Zealand than in Britain.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 19873.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Free-riding; trade union; New Zealand; Britain;
Other versions of this item:
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
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