Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority

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Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority

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Jakub Steiner ()

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Jakub Steiner

Abstract

This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources su±cient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under stochastic evolution.

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Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 149.

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Length: 15
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:149

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-12-16 (All new papers)
NEP-PBE-2006-12-16 (Public Economics)
NEP-SOC-2006-12-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Ellison, Glenn, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45, January.
Jakub Steiner, 2005. "A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp246, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jakub Steiner, 2007. "A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(1), pages 1-4. [Downloadable!]
Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0206, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alm, James & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Tax compliance as a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 297-312, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Jakub Steiner, 2007. "A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(1), pages 1-4. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jakub Steiner, 2005. "A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp246, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]

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