Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority
AbstractThis paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources su±cient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under stochastic evolution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 149.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Commitment; Enforcement; Punishment; Stochastic Evolution.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2006-12-16 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-12-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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