The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

Author Info

Ania, Ana B.
Wagener, Andreas

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule ``imitate the best.'' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on {\em intermediate} values of the policy instrument.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 10332.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 18 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:10332

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Ana B. Ania & Andreas Wagener, 2009. "The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Ania, Ana B. & Wagener, Andreas, 2009. "The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen FakultÃ¤t der UniversitÃ¤t Hannover dp-416, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Health, Education, and Welfare
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-04-05 (All new papers)
NEP-EVO-2009-04-05 (Evolutionary Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

David E. Wildasin, 1994. "Income Redistribution and Migration," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 637-56, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Wildasin, D.E., 1992. "Income Restribution and Migration," Papers 92-003, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- David Wildasin, 1991. "Income Redistribution and Migration," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2004. "Yardstick competition in intergovernmental relationships: theory and empirical predictions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-333, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-74, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
Kolmar, Martin, 2007. "Beveridge versus Bismarck public-pension systems in integrated markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 649-669, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Factor mobility and redistribution," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 57, pages 2529-2560 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1997. "On the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 265-281, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Myers, G.M. & Mansoorian, A., 1995. "On the Consequences of Government Objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations," Papers 95-2, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
Martina Eckardt, 2003. "The Open Method of Co-ordination on Pensions - An Economic Analysis of its Effects on Pension Reforms," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 39, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2003. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 181-196, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2002. "Social Insurance Competition between Bismark and Beveridge," IDEI Working Papers 141, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
- Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., 2001. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," CORE Discussion Papers 2001031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2000. "A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 195-206, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.