# The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

## Author Info

• Ania, Ana B.
• Wagener, Andreas
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## Abstract

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule imitate the best.'' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on {\em intermediate} values of the policy instrument.

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## Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 10332.

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Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:10332

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## Related research

Keywords: Open Method of Coordination; Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; Imitation; Mobility; Redistribution.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
• H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
• H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
• C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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## References

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## Citations

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Cited by:
1. Strunz, Sebastian & Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul, 2014. "Towards a general "Europeanization" of EU Member States' energy policies?," UFZ Discussion Papers 17/2014, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
2. Ana B. Ania & Andreas Wagener, 2014. "Decentrqalized Redistribution in a Laboratory Federation," Vienna Economics Papers 1402, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

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