This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
"Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Xiaodong Wu (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number
1766.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1766Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993.
"Interconnected games and international environmental problems ,"
Environmental & Resource Economics ,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale ,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale ,"
Papers
21-92, Tel Aviv.
Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale ,"
Papers
162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993.
"Protection for Sale ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1985.
"Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 269-281, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bui, Linda T M, 1998.
"Gains from Trade and Strategic Interaction: Equilibrium Acid Rain Abatement in the Eastern United States and Canada ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 984-1001, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Esther Gal-Or, 1991.
"A Common Agency with Incomplete Information ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 274-286, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mirrlees, James A, 1971.
"An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 1997.
"Competition between asymmetrically informed principals ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 227-240.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995.
"Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
repec:cup:cbooks:9780521629560 is not listed on IDEAS
Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996.
"Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986.
"Common Agency ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993.
"International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies ,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management ,
Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David Martimort, 1992.
"Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection ,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique ,
ADRES, issue 28, pages 01, Octobre-D.
[Downloadable!]
Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999.
"A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Claudio Mezzetti, 1997.
"Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 323-345, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 1994.
"Competition under Nonlinear Pricing ,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique ,
ADRES, issue 34, pages 04, Avril-Jui.
[Downloadable!]
Ivaldi, M. & Martimort, D., 1992.
"Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing ,"
Papers
93.288, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
Other versions: Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Harrison, Ann E., 1997.
"Moving to greener pastures : multinationals and the pollution-haven hypothesis ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1744, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Gunnar A. Eskeland & Ann E. Harrison, 2002.
"Moving to Greener Pastures? Multinationals and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis ,"
NBER Working Papers
8888, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Harrison, Ann E., 2003.
"Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis ,"
Journal of Development Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-23, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: David Martimort, 1996.
"Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1995.
"Trade and Transboundary Pollution ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 716-37, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991.
"Privatization and Incentives ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
Other versions: Martimort, David, 1994.
"Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory ,"
IDEI Working Papers
43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
Hoel, Michael, 1997.
"Coordination of environmental policy for transboundary environmental problems? ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 199-224, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.
This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .