Players with Limited Memory
AbstractThis paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. In particular, the players do not know if they are playing a game. We show that players do better in games than in decision problems. This is because the players, unknowingly, improve the environment they face in games. We also show that people can do quite well in games even with severely limited memories, although memory restrictions tend to make them behave cautiously. Lastly, we introduce a solution concept approiate for analysis games in which the players may have limited knowledge of their environment and have some memory restictions. We show hos this solution concept is related to other like the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies.
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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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- Huck, S. & Sarin, R., 2004. "Players with limited memory," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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