This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Poverty traps: a perspective from development economics

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alice Nicole Sindzingre

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The concepts of coordination and cooperation are widely used in economics, and particularly in game theory. They were also at the foundation of development economics at the time of WWII, with Paul Rosenstein-Rodan highlighting the existence of intersectoral spillovers effects, multiple equilibria and underdevelopment traps. These concepts returned to the forefront of development theory in the 1970s with the notions of coordination failure and poverty traps, as well as the research on social norms. One example was Samuel Bowles’ seminal concept of ‘institutional poverty traps’, i.e. highly inegalitarian institutions that persist even though they are inefficient. Membership institutions are of particular relevance in developing countries, and therefore in development economics. The paper explores the cognitive dimensions of coordination failures and institutional traps; it reveals that local institutions in developing countries may be efficient and examines the conditions in which norms create poverty traps, in particular membership norms. Firstly, it is argued that institutions and norms are key causes of the formation and persistence of poverty traps. Institutions and norms are complex cognitive devices, some beliefs and norms appear to be particularly resilient and difficult to revise. Secondly, it is shown that no particular institutional form is ex ante a cause of poverty traps: depending on contexts, the same institutional forms can be efficient or inefficient. It is the combination of multiple elements – economic and political environment, and social norms - that create thresholds effects and entrap groups into low equilibria. Thirdly, it is argued that the norms that organise group membership, because they involve beliefs that are difficult to revise, are typical factors of poverty traps.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/pdf/dt/2007/WP_EcoX_2007-26.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2007-26.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2007-26

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 200 Avenue de la R�publique, B�t. K - 92001 Nanterre Cedex
Phone: 01 40 97 59 07
Fax: 01 40 97 70 57
Email:
Web page: http://economix.u-paris10.fr
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Bruno Chaves).

Related research
Keywords: Poverty traps coordination failures social norms

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Roland Benabou, 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 96-129, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marcel Fafchamps, 2003. "Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1227-1227. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Fafchamps, Marcel, 2000. "Ethnicity and credit in African manufacturing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 205-235, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Colin Camerer & George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, 2005. "Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(1), pages 9-64, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Munshi, Kaivan & Myaux, Jacques, 2006. "Social norms and the fertility transition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 1-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 2003. "Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanations of Economic Differences," NBER Working Papers 9989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2005. "Commons as insurance and the welfare impact of privatization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 211-231, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Grimard, Franque, 1997. "Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 391-422, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Fafchamps, Marcel & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1999. " Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 5-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alberto Alesina & Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2001. "Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1938, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Costas Azariadis, 1996. "The Economics of Poverty Traps Part One: Complete Markets," Working Papers 9606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    Other versions:
  14. Azariadis, Costas & Drazen, Allan, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 501-26, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Avinash Dixit, 2001. "On Modes of Economic Governance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2001. "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1936, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Denzau, Arthur T & North, Douglass C, 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31.
    Other versions:
  19. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Hoff, Karla & Pandey, Priyanka, 2004. "Belief systems and durable inequalities : an experimental investigation of Indian caste," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3351, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  22. Caplan, Bryan, 2003. "The idea trap: the political economy of growth divergence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 183-203, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Egidi, Massimo & Narduzzo, Alessandro, 1997. "The emergence of path-dependent behaviors in cooperative contexts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 677-709, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2005. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Working Papers 929, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  25. Benabou, Roland, 2004. "Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract," Papers 08-15-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  26. repec:att:wimass:1920317 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  28. Fafchamps, Marcel & Gabre-Madhin, Eleni & Minten, Bart, 2005. "Increasing returns and market efficiency in agricultural trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 406-442, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  29. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1992. "Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 147-74, October.
  30. Volker Müller-Benedict, 2002. "Xenophobia and Social Closure: a Development of a Model from Coleman," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5. [Downloadable!]
  31. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2005. "Experiments and Economic Development: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0505, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  32. Jayraman, Raji & Lanjouw, Peter, 1998. "The evolution of poverty and inequality in Indian villages," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1870, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  33. Thorvaldur Gylfason & Gylfi Zoega, 2006. "Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of Investment," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(8), pages 1091-1115, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  34. Greif, Avner, 1992. "Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 128-33, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Gowdy, John & Iorgulescu, Raluca & Onyeiwu, Stephen, 2003. "Fairness and retaliation in a rural Nigerian village," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 469-479, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Why is there Multilateral Lending?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  37. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  38. Geertz, Clifford, 1978. "The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 28-32, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  39. Jean Tirole & Roland Benabou, 2004. "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics," 2004 Meeting Papers 15, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    Other versions:
  40. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2003. "Fairness and Redistribution: U.S. versus Europe," NBER Working Papers 9502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  41. Bardhan, Pranab K, 1983. "Labor-Tying in a Poor Agrarian Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 501-14, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  42. Durlauf, Steven N, 1996. " A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 75-93, March.
    Other versions:
  43. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-50, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  44. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-6.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.