Institutional strengthening of the free market in the new economic history
AbstractThe article highlights the current theories in the New Economic History, explaining the market social order rules imposed in the Western World in the post Renaissance period. The social order structure, based on impersonal exchange and rational prudence, differing from any other order in the history of human societies, is derived from a specific set of political and military conditions and world view. The institutional decisions taken as a result thereof enable the contemporary levels of production, trade and economic growth. The applied explanatory approach integrates on the ground of their common features the alternative concepts of this process elaborated by À. Greif, À. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, D. North, J. Wallis and B. Weingast.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute in its journal Economic Thought.
Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Stockholm School)
- B16 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Quantitative and Mathematical
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