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Bargaining on Law and Bureaucracies: A Constitutional Theory of Development

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  • Eric Brousseau

    (Université de Paris X - Nanterre)

  • Yves Schemeil

    (Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires)

  • Jérôme Sgard

    (Centre d'études et de recherches internationales)

Abstract

The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation. This process relies on two intertwined dynamics. First, in the establishment of the rule of law, legal instruments are appropriated by those who call for more autonomy, resulting in a progressive equalization of rights. Second, development of a capable and impartial state is a prerequisite to implementation of rights, including their translation into services delivered to citizens. The mutual expansion of these dynamics relies on a vertical negotiation between the elite and the governed. The governed call for rights that are more firmly established and more extended. The ruling elite can grant these rights to maintain its legitimacy and hence its recognized authority. This model allows discussing the sustainability of various paths of institutional change in processes of development by identifying the potential virtuous dynamics and hindering factors.

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Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/4vc7skecu3q7u7s984pgpg64m.

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Date of creation: Sep 2010
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Comparative Economics, 2010, vol. 38, pp.253-266
Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4vc7skecu3q7u7s984pgpg64m

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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
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  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 13608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Guido Tabellini, 2004. "The Role of the State in Economic Development," Working Papers 265, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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  10. Hadfield, Gillian K., 2008. "The levers of legal design: Institutional determinants of the quality of law," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 43-73, March.
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  13. Peter Murrell, 2009. "Design and Evolution in Institutional Development: The Insignificance of the English Bill of Rights," Electronic Working Papers, University of Maryland, Department of Economics 09-001, University of Maryland, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Raynaud, Emmanuel & Brousseau, Eric, 2011. "“Climbing the hierarchical ladders of rules”: A life-cycle theory of institutional evolution," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7081, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Thomas Bolognesi, 2014. "Modernisation of urban water services management in Europe and prospects for sustainability: an analysis in terms of institutional resource regimes," Working Papers halshs-01058059, HAL.
  3. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2012. "Testing The Pearl Hypothesis: Natural resources and trust," Resources Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 358-367.

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