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The kin system as a poverty trap?

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Author Info
Hoff, Karla
Sen, Arijit

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Abstract

An institution found in many traditional societies is the extended family system (kin system), an informal system of shared rights and obligations among extended family for the purpose of mutual assistance. In predominantly non-market economies, the kin system is a valuable institution providing critical community goods and insurance services in the absence of market or public provision. But what happens when the market sector grows in the process of economic development? How do the members of kin groups respond, individually and collectively, to such changes? When the kin system"meets"the modern economy, does the kin system act as a"vehicle of progress"helping its members adapt, or as an"instrument of stagnation"holding back its members from benefiting from market development? In reality, the consequences of membership in a kin group have been varied for people in different parts of the world. Hoff and Sen characterize the conditions under which the kin system becomes a dysfunctional institution when facing an expanding modern economy. The authors first show that when there are moral hazard problems in the modern sector, the kin system may exacerbate them. When modern sector employers foresee that, they will offer employment opportunities on inferior terms to members of ethnic groups that practice the kin system. These entry barriers in the market, in turn, create an incentive for some individuals to break ties with their kin group, which hurts members of the group who stay back in the traditional sector. The authors then show in a simple migration model that if a kin group can take collective action to raise exit barriers, then even if migrating to the modern sector and breaking ties increases aggregate welfare (and even if a majority of members are expected to gain ex post, after the resolution of uncertainty about the identity of the winners and losers), a majority of agents within a kin group may support ex ante raising the exit barrier to prevent movement to the modern sector. This result is an example of the bias toward the status quo analyzed by Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik in the context of trade reform. The authors do not claim that all kin groups will necessarily exhibit such a bias against beneficial regime changes. But they provide a clear intuition about the forces that can lead to the collective conservatism of a kin system facing expanding opportunities in a market economy-forces that can lead the kin group to become a poverty trap for its members.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3575.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3575

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Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Information Technology; Environmental Economics&Policies; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; Banks&Banking Reform;

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  4. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Carrington, William J & Detragiache, Enrica & Vishwanath, Tara, 1996. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 909-30, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Mckenzie, David & Rapoport, Hillel, 2007. "Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-24, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kaivan Munshi, 2003. "Networks In The Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants In The U.S. Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(2), pages 549-599, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Garofalo, M.R. & Marra, M, 2007. "Work-Life Reconciliation Policies From Well-Being To Development: Rethinking EU Gender Mainstreaming," MPRA Paper 9598, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Costas Aariadis & John Stachurski, 2004. "Poverty Traps," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 913, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Azariadis, Costas & Stachurski, John, 2005. "Poverty Traps," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Subramanian, Arjunan & Qaim, Matin, 2006. "Competition, Kinship or Reciprocity? Village Experiments in Alternative Modes of Exchange," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25434, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kaushik Basu, 2007. "Participatory Equity, Identity, and Productivity Policy Implications for Promoting Development," Working Papers id:1122, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Sindzingre, Alice, 2005. "Explaining Threshold Effects of Globalization on Poverty: An Institutional Perspective," Working Papers RP2005/53, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  6. Piacentini, Mario, 2008. "Migration Enclaves, Schooling Choices and Social Mobility," MPRA Paper 8376, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Basu, Kaushik & Felkey, Amanda J., 2008. "A Theory of Efficiency Wage with Multiple Unemployment Equilibria: How a Higher Minimum Wage Law Can Curb Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 3381, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Patrinos, Harry Anthony & Skoufias, Emmanuel & Lunde, Trine, 2007. "Indigenous peoples in Latin America : economic opportunities and social networks," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4227, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Luciano Fanti & Luca Spataro, 2008. "Poverty traps and intergenerational transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(6), pages 693-711, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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