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Les augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés en France - Employee Equity Issue:Evidence from France

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  • Djaoudath Alidou

    ()
    (Université de Bourgogne - LEG/FARGO UMR Cnrs 5118)

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    Abstract

    (VF)Cet article se propose de vérifier, du point de vue de la théorie positive de l’agence, si la décision des entreprises de recourir à une augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés est influencée par la prise en compte par les dirigeants des intérêts des actionnaires et de la politique de l’Etat. A partir d’un échantillon de 110 sociétés non financières appartenant au SBF 250 de 1998 à 2007, les résultats issus des régressions sur des données de panel permettent de confirmer en partie les prédictions de la théorie positive de l’agence. La décision des entreprises de recourir à une augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés apparaît plutôt influencée par le cadre légal défini par l’Etat pour la mise en place de cette opération. Les résultats montrent que les intérêts des actionnaires ont une relative influence sur la décision des entreprises d’ouvrir le capital aux salariés. Les résultats ne permettent pas de confirmer que cette opération constitue une source alternative de financement pour les entreprises fortement endettées. A l’instar de plusieurs études antérieures, les résultats ne permettent pas non plus d’établir une relation entre la performance de l’entreprise et la décision de recourir à une augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés.(VA)The objective of this article is to verify, from the positive agency theory perspective, whether the fact that executives take into account shareholders’ interests and the State policy affects companies’ decision to issue shares reserved to employees. Using a sample of 110 non financial French companies belonging to the SBF250 index covering the period 1998 to 2007, the results partially confirm the predictions of the positive agency theory. We find that the adoption of employee equity issue seems rather influenced by the regulations governing the issuance of these shares. Our empirical results show some support for the effect of shareholders’ interests on the decision to issue shares reserved to employees. However, there is no evidence that supports the use of employee equity issue as an alternative source of financing for highly-leveraged companies. Consistent with previous studies, we also find no evidence that supports the relation between companies’ performance and the decision to issue shares reserved to employees.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1110603.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1110603

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    Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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    Web page: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/FARGO/

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    Related research

    Keywords: augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés; performance; système de gouvernance; intérêts des actionnaires; politique de l’Etat; employee equity issue; corporate governance; shareholders’ interests; State policy.;

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    References

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