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Les actionnaires salariés

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Author Info
Philippe Desbrières () (Université de Bourgogne LATEC/FARGO)

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Abstract

L'actionnariat est l'une des formules de participation financière utilisées pour stimuler les efforts des salariés. Il leur permet de constituer un portefeuille de valeurs mobilières et d'acquérir, souvent dans des conditions avantageuses, des actions de la société qui les emploie. Mais il conduit les salariés à y assumer un double statut : d'apporteur de capital humain d'une part, d'apporteur de ressources financières d'autre part. Se pose alors de manière accrue le problème de la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts. Cet article s'intéresse aux conditions d'efficacité de la pratique de l'actionnariat, tant au niveau des attitudes et du comportement des salariés qu'à celui des performances individuelles et collectives. Il traite ensuite des incidences de cet actionnariat salarié sur le système de gouvernement des entreprises qui les adoptent, les droits attachés aux actions détenues par les salariés pouvant leur permettre d'exercer un contrôle effectif sur les décisions stratégiques de la firme, ou bien de servir les intérêts des dirigeants poursuivant une stratégie d'enracinement.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1021101.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2002
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Publication status: published in dans Revue Française de Gestion, n°141, novembre-décembre 2002, p.255-281.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1021101

Note: article publié dans Revue Française de Gestion, n°141, novembre-décembre 2002, p.255-281.
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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Phone: +33(0)380395435
Fax: +33(0)380395488

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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Related research
Keywords: actionnariat-salarié; incitation; performance; gouvernance;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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