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Une typologie de l'activisme des actionnaires minoritaires en France

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  • Carine Girard

    (Université de Franche Comté)

Abstract

The paper's purpose is to propose a typology of minority shareholders' activism in France. With the corporate governance theory, we study minority shareholders' activism. We identify their investment decisions, their abilities to collect and treat information and their power to control. The objective is to explain what kind of control they could exercise and what strategies they use. This activism is characterized by influence activities like lobbying, proxy contests and judicial actions. We suppose that contest process is a function of dissident coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Carine Girard, 2001. "Une typologie de l'activisme des actionnaires minoritaires en France," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(3), pages 123-146, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:4:y:2001:i:q3:p:123-146
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Siala Bouaziz Souha & Jarboui Anis & David McMillan, 2016. "Corporate governance and firm characteristics as explanatory factors of shareholder activism: Validation through the French context," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 1150407-115, December.
    2. Céline Du Boys, 2009. "Is payout policy part of the corporate governance system? The case of France," Post-Print hal-01290737, HAL.
    3. Julien Le Maux, 2004. "Les déterminants de l’ampleur des bénéfices privés:un test sur données françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(2), pages 195-231, June.
    4. Déjean, Frédérique, 2004. "Contribution à l'étude de l'investissement socialement responsable : Les stratégies de légitimation des sociétés de gestion," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/10473 edited by Colasse, Bernard.
    5. Michel Albouy & Alain Schatt, 2004. "Les prises de contrôle par les actionnaires contestataires:le cas André," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(2), pages 33-65, June.
    6. Vanessa Serret & Sylvie Berthelot, 2013. "Activisme Actionnarial Et Responsabilite Sociale Des Entreprises Au Canada : Analyse Des Resolutions Soumises Par Les Actionnaires Entre 2000 Et 2011," Post-Print hal-01002373, HAL.
    7. Jonathan Labbé, 2020. "Venture capital risk, start-ups and innovation: the syndication of venture capital investments recipe [Capital-risque, start-ups et innovation : la recette du financement par syndication]," Post-Print hal-03000103, HAL.
    8. Quôc Thai Huynh, 2010. "Les déterminants de l’activisme des actionnaires minoritaires:insuffisance de gouvernance affichée ou de résultats financiers?," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 13(3), pages 95-114., September.
    9. Djaoudath Alidou, 2011. "Les augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés en France - Employee Equity Issue:Evidence from France," Working Papers CREGO 1110603, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    10. Karen Moris, 2014. "The Media Influency On The Corporate Governance Practices [L'Influence Des Medias Sur Les Pratiques De Gouvernance D'Entreprise]," Post-Print hal-01899412, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    activism; judicial procedural; minority shareholders; proxy contests.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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