Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Les prises de contrôle par les actionnaires contestataires:le cas André

Contents:

Author Info

  • Michel Albouy

    ()
    (Université de Grenoble 2 et Grenoble EM)

  • Alain Schatt

    (Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

(VF)Le groupe André a fait l’objet d’un mouvement de contestation, initié au début de l’ann ée 2000 par deux actionnaires anglo-saxons pour obtenir des postes d’administrateurs. Cette opération, inédite en France, a permis aux contestataires d’obtenir un nombre suffisant de sièges pour procéder au remplacement des dirigeants. Si l’impact de cette opération sur la valeur du Groupe André est légèrement positif à court terme, les performances opérationnel-les et boursières augmentent significativement à long terme. Par ailleurs, la rentabilité de cette opération diffère sensiblement pour les deux actionnai-res contestataires. (VA) Group André, a French corporation, was the target of a proxy fight which started in early 2000 and was initiated by two Anglo-Saxon shareholders searching to take over control of the board of directors. This operation, so far quite unusual in France, enabled the dissident share-holders to replace the top managers. The impact of this operation on Group André’s firm value is shown to be slightly positive in the short run, whereas operating and stock-price performance significantly increase in the long run. In addition, this opera-tion leads to considerably different re-turns when looking at each one of the two dissident shareholders separately.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/rev/072065.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 33-65

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q2:p:33-65

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.revues.org/

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: conseil d’administration; bataille de procurations; bloc de contrôle; création de valeur; board of directors; proxy fight; block of control; value creation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Géraldine Broye & Alain Schatt, 2003. "Sous-évaluation à l'introduction et cessions d'actions par les actionnaires d'origine:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(2), pages 67-89, June.
  2. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "Le conseil d'administration dans les théories de la gouvernance," Working Papers CREGO 001201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Dec 2000.
  3. Ikenberry, David & Lakonishok, Josef, 1993. "Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 405-35, July.
  4. Dominique Poincelot & Alain Schatt, 1999. "Le rachat de leurs propres actions par les sociétés cotées en bourse:bilan d'une pratique nouvelle en France," Working Papers CREGO 0991103, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
  6. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
  7. Philippe Desbrières & Alain Schatt, 2002. "The Impacts of LBOs on the Performance of Acquired Firms:the French Case," Working Papers CREGO 1020702, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Laurence Godard & Alain Schatt, 2000. "Quelles sont les caractéristiques optimales du conseil d'administration?," Working Papers CREGO 1000901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  10. Dodd, Peter & Warner, Jerold B., 1983. "On corporate governance : A study of proxy contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 401-438, April.
  11. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
  12. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1989. "Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 29-59, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Quôc Thai Huynh, 2010. "Les déterminants de l’activisme des actionnaires minoritaires:insuffisance de gouvernance affichée ou de résultats financiers?," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 13(3), pages 95-114., September.
  2. Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 8(3), pages 77-104, September.
  3. Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises;Ownership Structure and Corporate Disclosures:The French Case," Working Papers CREGO 1050701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  4. Peter Wirtz, 2004. "The Changing Institutions of Governance in Corporate France:What Drives the Process?," Working Papers CREGO 1040701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q2:p:33-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gérard Charreaux).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.