This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Les prises de contrôle par les actionnaires contestataires:le cas André

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Michel Albouy () (Université de Grenoble 2 et Grenoble EM)
Alain Schatt (Université de Franche-Comté)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

(VF)Le groupe André a fait l’objet d’un mouvement de contestation, initié au début de l’ann ée 2000 par deux actionnaires anglo-saxons pour obtenir des postes d’administrateurs. Cette opération, inédite en France, a permis aux contestataires d’obtenir un nombre suffisant de sièges pour procéder au remplacement des dirigeants. Si l’impact de cette opération sur la valeur du Groupe André est légèrement positif à court terme, les performances opérationnel-les et boursières augmentent significativement à long terme. Par ailleurs, la rentabilité de cette opération diffère sensiblement pour les deux actionnai-res contestataires. (VA) Group André, a French corporation, was the target of a proxy fight which started in early 2000 and was initiated by two Anglo-Saxon shareholders searching to take over control of the board of directors. This operation, so far quite unusual in France, enabled the dissident share-holders to replace the top managers. The impact of this operation on Group André’s firm value is shown to be slightly positive in the short run, whereas operating and stock-price performance significantly increase in the long run. In addition, this opera-tion leads to considerably different re-turns when looking at each one of the two dissident shareholders separately.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/rev/072065.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Editions Economica in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 33-65
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q2:p:33-65

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France
Phone: +33(0)145781292
Fax: +33(0)145750567
Web page: http://www.economica.fr/

Order Information:
Postal: Economica, 49,rue Héricart, 75015 Paris, France

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Gérard Charreaux).

Related research
Keywords: conseil d’administration; bataille de procurations; bloc de contrôle; création de valeur; board of directors; proxy fight; block of control; value creation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peter Wirtz, 2004. "The Changing Institutions of Governance in Corporate France:What Drives the Process?," Working Papers FARGO 1040701, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  2. Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Editions Economica, vol. 8(3), pages 77-104, September. [Downloadable!]
  3. Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises;Ownership Structure and Corporate Disclosures:The French Case," Working Papers FARGO 1050701, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.