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Les déterminants de la "qualité" des conseils d'administration français

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Author Info
Laurence Godard () (Université de Franche-Comté)
Alain Schatt () (Université de Franche-Comté)

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Abstract

Dans cet article, nous vérifions si la "qualité" des conseils d'administration dépend de la structure de propriété et de la politique financière des grandes sociétés cotées en bourse, caractérisées par une séparation de la décision (control) et du contrôle (ownership). En nous basant sur la théorie de l'agence, nous considérons que les conseils sont de meilleure qualité lorsqu'ils comprennent une fraction élevée d'administrateurs indépendants et/ou lorsque les fonctions de direction générale et de présidence du conseil sont dissociées. Pour les 85 sociétés cotées en bourse de notre échantillon, nous confirmons notamment que la qualité des conseils croît avec la fraction d'actions détenues par le public

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File URL: http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/WP/1040603.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1040603.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1040603

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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Related research
Keywords: conseil d'administration; membres indépendants; dissociation des fonctions; structure de propriété; politique financière;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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