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Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises;Ownership Structure and Corporate Disclosures:The French Case

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Author Info

  • Réal Labelle

    ()
    (HEC Montréal)

  • Alain Schatt

    ()
    (Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

(VF)Cette étude empirique a pour objet de vérifier s’il existe une relation entre la structure de propriété et la qualité de la communication financière des entreprises françaises. Nos résultats indiquent que la relation entre la dilution de l’actionnariat et la qualité des relations avec les investisseurs n’est pas linéaire mais curvilinéaire.(VA)The objective of this empirical study is to test the hypothesized relation between ownership structure and the quality of financial reporting of French firms. The results confirm that the relation between shareholding dilution and the quality of investors’ relations is not linear but curvilinear.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1050701.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1050701

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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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Related research

Keywords: communication financière; relations avec les investisseurs; rapports annuels; structure de propriété; financial disclosure; relations with investors; annual report; ownership structure;

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References

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