Liquidity and Control : A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure
AbstractThe paper develops a theory of ownership structure based on the notion that corporate control and secondary market liquidity are not perfectly compatible with each other. We analyse the tradeoff between these two objectives for two different ownership structures: the privately held firm, which is characterised by restricted trading opportunities for owners and non-anonymous trading, and the publicly traded firm where trading opportunities are unrestricted and trading is anonymous. We develop pricing formulas for each structure, compare these with each other, and derive predictions for optimal ownership design, depending on the institutional structure of the capital market.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9712.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 154, No 1, March 199
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Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
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corporate control; liquidity; corporate governance; ownership structure;
Other versions of this item:
- Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998. "Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(1), pages 177-, March.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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- Constant Djama & Isabelle Martinez & Stéphanie Serve, 2012. "What do we know about delistings? A survey of the literature," THEMA Working Papers 2012-38, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises;Ownership Structure and Corporate Disclosures:The French Case," Working Papers FARGO 1050701, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
- Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Khurshed, A., 2004. "Shareholder Lockup Agreements in the European New Markets," Discussion Paper 2004-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo, 2007. "Local ownership as private information: Evidence on the monitoring-liquidity trade-off," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 751-792, March.
- Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 8(3), pages 77-104, September.
- Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 1999. "Prediction of Ownership and Control Concentration in German and UK Initial Public Offerings," Discussion Paper 1999-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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