Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure
AbstractThe paper develops a theory of ownership structure based on the notion that corporate control and secondary market liquidity are not perfectly compatible with eath other. We analyze the tradeoff between these two objectives for two different ownership structures: the privately held firm, which is characterized by restricted trading opportunities for owners and non-anonymous trading, and the publicly traded firm where trading opportunities are unrestricted and trading is anonymous. We develop pricing formulas for each structure, compare these with each other, and derive predictions for optimal ownership design, depending on the institutional structure of the capital market.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 154 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Other versions of this item:
- Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1997. "Liquidity and Control : A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9712, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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- Lammertjan Dam & Bert Scholtens, 2013. "Ownership Concentration and CSR Policy of European Multinational Enterprises," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 117-126, November.
- Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Khurshed, A., 2004. "Shareholder Lockup Agreements in the European New Markets," Discussion Paper 2004-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2003.
"Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises,"
- Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 8(3), pages 77-104, September.
- Constant Djama & Isabelle Martinez & Stéphanie Serve, 2012. "What do we know about delistings? A survey of the literature," THEMA Working Papers 2012-38, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo, 2007. "Local ownership as private information: Evidence on the monitoring-liquidity trade-off," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 751-792, March.
- Constant Djama & Isabelle Martinez & Stéphanie Serve, 2012. "What do we know about delistings? A survey of the literature," Post-Print hal-00937899, HAL.
- Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 1999. "Prediction of Ownership and Control Concentration in German and UK Initial Public Offerings," Discussion Paper 1999-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2005. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises;Ownership Structure and Corporate Disclosures:The French Case," Working Papers CREGO 1050701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
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