This paper examines how information and ownership structure affect voting outcomes on shareholder-sponsored proposals to change corporate governance structure. The authors find that the outcomes of votes vary systematically with the governance and performance records of target firms, the identity of proposal sponsors, and the type of proposal. The authors also find that outcomes vary significantly as a function of ownership by insiders, institutions, outside blockholders, employee stock ownership plans, and outside directors who are blockholders. These results suggest that both public information and ownership structure have a significant influence on voting outcomes. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 48 (1993) Issue (Month): 2 (June) Pages: 697-718 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)