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Communication Costs, Information Acquisition, and Voting Decisions in Proxy Contests

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  • Bhattacharya, Utpal

Abstract

This article synthesizes some recent progress in the theories of corporate control and political lobbying to model the proxy campaign as a political campaign. The model yields a number of testable implications, only some of which have been examined in the literature. For example, if the loss from voting for a "bad" dissident exceeds the gain from voting for a "good" dissident, the model predicts that as communication costs fall, the number of proxy fights increases, announcement day returns decrease, and the fraction of dissident wins first increases and then decreases. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhattacharya, Utpal, 1997. "Communication Costs, Information Acquisition, and Voting Decisions in Proxy Contests," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(4), pages 1065-1097.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:10:y:1997:i:4:p:1065-97
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    Cited by:

    1. Zakaria Babutsidze & Maurizio Iacopetta, 2016. "Innovation, growth and financial markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-24, March.
    2. Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. Carine Girard, 2001. "Une typologie de l'activisme des actionnaires minoritaires en France," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(3), pages 123-146, September.
    4. Hart, Oliver & Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 2001. "Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/258fqttgag854r8bkhc16pmoo5 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    7. Lee, Choonsik, 2021. "Mitigating information imperfections in proxy contests: The effect of dissidents' proxy solicitation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Levit, Doron, 2019. "Corporate control activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-17.
    9. Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 2001. "Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 8633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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