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The Uses, Value and Limitation of Game Theoretic Methods in Defense Analysis

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Abstract

The central contribution of game theory to defense analysis has been a language for the understanding of how to formulate and study strategic or cross-purposes optimization in situations involving two or more actors. It is suggested here in this discussion that two fundamentally different classes of application of game theory to problems in defense have emerged. The first is the application of two-person zero sum game theory to military, primarily tactical situations which for the purposes at hand can be reasonably well modeled in this manner. The second is the application of two or more person nonconstant sum game theory to strategic problems involving threat analysis, crises control and the interface between international diplomatic relations and war.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d07b/d0766.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 766.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1985
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:766

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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Keywords: Game theory; war; national defense;

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  1. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Deterrence and cooperation : A classification of two-person games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 179-193.
  2. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  3. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  4. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-72, March.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 1985. "Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176-188.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 109, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
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