The central contribution of game theory to defense analysis has been a language for the understanding of how to formulate and study strategic or cross-purposes optimization in situations involving two or more actors. It is suggested here in this discussion that two fundamentally different classes of application of game theory to problems in defense have emerged. The first is the application of two-person zero sum game theory to military, primarily tactical situations which for the purposes at hand can be reasonably well modeled in this manner. The second is the application of two or more person nonconstant sum game theory to strategic problems involving threat analysis, crises control and the interface between international diplomatic relations and war.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Brams, Steven J. & Wittman, DOnald, 1980.
"Nonmyoptic Equilibria,"
Working Papers
80-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.