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A Model of Financial Fragility

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Author Info
Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)
Stacey L. Schreft (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas)

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Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility. The model has two essential features. First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge financial linkages among agents. Second, iid shocks to investment projects’ operations at a single date cause some projects to fail. Investors who experience losses from project failures reallocate their portfolios, thereby breaking some linkages. In the Pareto-efficient symmetric equilibrium studied, two related types of financial crises can occur in response. One occurs gradually as defaults spread, causing even more links to break. An economy is more fragile ex post the more severe this financial crisis. The other type of crisis occurs instantaneously when forward-looking investors preemptively shift their wealth into a safe asset in anticipation of the contagion affecting them in the future. An economy is more fragile ex ante the earlier all of its linkages break from such a crisis. The paper also considers whether fragility is worse for larger economies.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9803001.

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Date of creation: 10 Mar 1998
Date of revision: 30 Apr 1998
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9803001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  8. Russell Cooper & Dean Corbae, 1997. "Financial Fragility and the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 6094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Andrew Atkeson & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 1996. "The balance of payments and borrowing constraints: an alternative view of the Mexican crisis," Staff Report 212, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Hiroshi Fujiki & Edward J. Green & Akira Yamazaki, 1999. "Sharing the risk of settlement failure," Working Papers 594, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Financial Contagion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2092, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yaron Leitner, 2004. "Financial networks: contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts," Working Papers 02-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roger D. Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance," Research Working Paper 99-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. R. Andergassen, 2002. "financial contagion and asset price dynamics," Working Papers 448, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  6. James B. Bullard & Christopher J. Neely & David C. Wheelock, 2009. "Systemic risk and the financial crisis: a primer," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 403-418. [Downloadable!]
  7. Russell Cooper & Dean Corbae, 2001. "Financial collapse and active monetary policy: a lesson from the Great Depression," Staff Report 289, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, 2009. "Complexity and Financial Panics," NBER Working Papers 14997, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Andreas Lehnert & Wayne Passmore, 1999. "Pricing systemic crises: monetary and fiscal policy when savers are uncertain," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1999-33, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  10. Laura E. Kodres & Matthew Pritsker, 1998. "A rational expectations model of financial contagion," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-48, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  11. Ana Babus, 2007. "The Formation of Financial Networks," Working Papers 2007.69, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Zsolt Becsi & Victor Li & Ping Wang, . "Mismatch in Credit Markets," Departmental Working Papers 2002-03, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Franz R. Hahn, 1998. "Currency Crises. A Challenge for Economic Theory and Policy," Austrian Economic Quarterly, WIFO, vol. 3(4), pages 183-190, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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