Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence
AbstractThis essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 829.
Length: 97 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1987
Date of revision:
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 489, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
237, David K. Levine.
- Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2001. " Games of Status," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 349-72.
- Harsanyi, John C., 1994.
"Games with Incomplete Information,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Competitive Valuation of Cooperative Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 482, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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