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A Strategic Weapons Exchange Allocation Model

Author

Listed:
  • Jerome Bracken

    (Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Virginia)

  • James E. Falk

    (The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.)

  • Frederic A. Miercort

    (Vienna, Virginia)

Abstract

We formulate a two-strike strategic weapons exchange, model as a max-min problem with the first striker's allocation affecting the second striker's feasible region. The max-min problem is shown to be equivalent to a separable, nonconvex program, to which an algorithm designed to locate an approximate global solution is then applied. The solution of three example problems is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerome Bracken & James E. Falk & Frederic A. Miercort, 1977. "A Strategic Weapons Exchange Allocation Model," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 968-976, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:25:y:1977:i:6:p:968-976
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.25.6.968
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes O. Royset & R. Kevin Wood, 2007. "Solving the Bi-Objective Maximum-Flow Network-Interdiction Problem," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 19(2), pages 175-184, May.
    2. Liu, Yi-Hsin & Spencer, Thomas H., 1995. "Solving a bilevel linear program when the inner decision maker controls few variables," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 644-651, March.
    3. Jeffrey H. Grotte, 1980. "Measuring Strategic Stability with Two-Strike Nuclear Exchange Models," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(2), pages 213-239, June.
    4. Martin Shubik, 1987. "Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 829, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Mathur, Kanchan & Puri, M. C., 1995. "A bilevel bottleneck programming problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 337-344, October.

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