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Game Theory, Complexity and Simplicity. Part III: Critique and Prospective

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

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Abstract

A discussion of some of the problems in the utilization of game theoretic solution concepts is given. It is suggested that a considerable broadening of solution concepts is called for to take into account sufficient context. Mass agent simulations appear to offer promise for some economic and societal problems.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p09b/p0967.pdf
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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d11b/d1184.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1184.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Complexity, 3(5), 1998
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1184

Note: CFP 967.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 489, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. P. Bak & M. Paczuski & M. Shubik, 1996. "Price Variations in a Stock Market with Many Agents," Working Papers 96-09-075, Santa Fe Institute.
    Other versions:
  3. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. John Rust, 1997. "Using Randomization to Break the Curse of Dimensionality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 487-516, May.
    Other versions:
  5. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  6. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Simon, Herbert A. & Schaeffer, Jonathan, 1992. "The game of chess," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-17 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Doron Sonsino & Marvin Mandelbaum, 2001. "On Preference for Flexibility and Complexity Aversion: Experimental Evidence1," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 197-216, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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