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Coalition Development In The Agricultural Marketing System

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  • Puaha, Hubertus
  • Tilley, Daniel S.
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    Abstract

    The theory of agricultural coalition formation is enhanced by incorporating non-monetary benefits, risk, and fairness. Producer's’ expected utility and investment decisions in the agricultural cooperative are affected by their perception about non-monetary benefits, risk and fairness associate with the cooperative investment. (Revised edition added in August 2002)

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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19721
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA with number 19721.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea02:19721

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    Keywords: Marketing;

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Staatz, John M., 1989. "Farmer Cooperative Theory: Recent Developments," Research Reports 52017, United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Development Business and Cooperative Programs.
    4. S.R. Johnson, 1998. "Strategic Behavior, Institutional Change, and the Future of Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(5), pages 898-915.
    5. Martin Shubik, 1998. "Game Theory, Complexity and Simplicity. Part III: Critique and Prospective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1184, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers 006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    8. Akerlof, George A, 1979. "The Case against Conservative Macroeconomics: An Inaugural Lecture," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 46(183), pages 219-37, August.
    9. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    10. John K. Horowitz & Richard E. Just & Sinaia Netanyahu, 1996. "Potential Benefits and Limitations of Game Theory in Agricultural Economics," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(3), pages 753-760.
    11. Demsetz, Harold, 1997. "The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 426-29, May.
    12. Coase, Ronald, 1998. "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 72-74, May.
    13. Stanley R. Johnson, 1998. "Strategic Behavior, Institutional Change, and the Future of Agriculture," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 98-wp199, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University.
    14. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    15. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
    16. Stanley R. Johnson, 1998. "Strategic Behavior, Institutional Change, and the Future of Agriculture," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 98-wp199, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
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