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Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d'approvisionnement de défense

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  • Claude Ménard

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Jean-Michel Oudot

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

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    Abstract

    Comment sont répartis les surcoûts qui résultent de la matérialisation de risques dans le cadre de relations contractuelles ? Nous proposons une réponse qui combine théorie des coûts de transaction et approche en termes d'équité, de manière à expliquer pourquoi des stratégies coopératives de répartition du type 50-50 prévalent sur la propension des partenaires à se comporter de façon opportuniste. Nous en dérivons deux propositions que nous confrontons à une base de données inédite composée de 48 contrats concernant l'approvisionnement de défense en France. Nous montrons que, sous certaines conditions, la perception d'une allocation équitable se révèle un facteur clé de la relation contractuelle, ce qui constitue un défi pour l'interprétation habituelle de la théorie des coûts de transaction.

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    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/62/42/80/PDF/2009-Oudot_MA_nard-Opportunisme_ou_Equite-_RFE.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00624280.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Publication status: Published, Revue Française d'Economie, 2010, 24, 3, 196-226
    Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00624280

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00624280
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    Related research

    Keywords: Contrats; équité; coûts de transaction; défense;

    References

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