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The Banzhaf Index in Complete and Incomplete Shareholding Structures: A New Algorithm

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  • Marc Levy

Abstract

In this global world many firms present a complex shareholding structure with indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers. Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between them. Determining who has the most influence often is a difficult task. To measure this influence, game theory allows modeling voting game and computing the Banzhaf index. This paper first offers a new algorithm to compute this index in all structures and suggests some modelisations of the floating shareholder. Then, our model is applied to a real case study: The French Group Lafarge. This exemplary case demonstrates how the float’s structure and hidden coalition can impact the power relationship between dominant shareholders.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 10-046.

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Length: 33 p.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by:
Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/63872

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Keywords: Ownership structure; Control; Banzhaf index;

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Cited by:
  1. Ramón Jesús Flores Díaz & Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada, 2013. "The Shapley group value," Statistics and Econometrics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Estadística y Econometría ws133430, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Estadística y Econometría.
  2. Marc Levy & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "Corporate Control with Cross-Ownership," Working Papers CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles 11-053, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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