The Banzhaf Index in Complete and Incomplete Shareholding Structures: A New Algorithm
AbstractIn this global world many firms present a complex shareholding structure with indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers. Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between them. Determining who has the most influence often is a difficult task. To measure this influence, game theory allows modeling voting game and computing the Banzhaf index. This paper first offers a new algorithm to compute this index in all structures and suggests some modelisations of the floating shareholder. Then, our model is applied to a real case study: The French Group Lafarge. This exemplary case demonstrates how the float’s structure and hidden coalition can impact the power relationship between dominant shareholders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 10-046.
Length: 33 p.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
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Ownership structure; Control; Banzhaf index;
Other versions of this item:
- Levy, Marc, 2011. "The Banzhaf index in complete and incomplete shareholding structures: A new algorithm," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(2), pages 411-421, December.
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-10-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-02 (Game Theory)
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- Marc Levy & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "Corporate Control with Cross-Ownership," Working Papers CEB 11-053, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Ramón Jesús Flores Díaz & Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada, 2013. "The Shapley group value," Statistics and Econometrics Working Papers ws133430, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Estadística y Econometría.
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