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State ownership and control in the Czech Republic

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  • Evžen Kočenda

    ()

  • Jan Hanousek

    ()

Abstract

We analyze the extent of the integrated control of the state over privatized firms during the post-privatization decade (1995–2005) in the Czech Republic. During this period the integrated control potential of the state resembled a corporate pyramid. While pyramidal control was not fully utilized, the golden share in the hands of the state substantially enhanced its ability to control firms. In terms of corporate performance we show that state control resulted in declining and even negative corporate performance. Integrated state control was shown to be mostly inferior when compared with private types of ownership. State ownership positions are in striking contrast with the lack of capacity to push corporate performance in order to collect larger tax volumes. Lack of focus and inter-agency cooperation as well as the simple inefficiency of the state bureaucracy are the most likely reasons behind our findings. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Change and Restructuring.

Volume (Year): 45 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 157-191

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:45:y:2012:i:3:p:157-191

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=113294

Related research

Keywords: Corporate pyramid; State ownership; Privatization; Corporate performance; Voting rights; Golden share; C51; D23; D24; L23; P26;

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Cited by:
  1. Baghdasaryan, Delia & la Cour, Lisbeth, 2013. "Competition, ownership and productivity. A panel analysis of Czech firms," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 86-100.
  2. Evžen Kocenda & Jan Hanousek, 2011. "Divide and Privatize: Firm Break-up and Performance," CESifo Working Paper Series 3465, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, 2011. "Extent of the Integrated State Ownership and Effect of the State Control on Performance of Czech Firms," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2011(1), pages 82-104.

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