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Assurance chômage et sociétés

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Author Info
Stéphane Pallage () (Economics Department, UQAM)
Christian Zimmermann () (Economics Department, UQAM)

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Abstract

Dans ce texte, nous nous penchons sur la question du chômage et de sa provenance. Notre réflexion nous amène à considérer le chômage essentiellement comme l'effet de l'adaptation de comportements individuels à une série de règles sociales. Une assurance chômage peut s'avérer utile, encore faut-il qu'elle soit choisie en tenant compte des effets dissuasifs qu'elle aura sur l'emploi. Nous faisons état d'une série d'outils de plus en plus raffinés pour déterminer une assurance chômage optimale, étant entendu que celle-ci variera d'une société à l'autre.

In this paper, we make an attempt at understanding unemployment and some of its many origins. Our inquiry leads us to view unemployment essentially as a perverse effect of social rules on individual behaviors. An unemployment insurance program may be socially desirable, yet its optimal level of generosity ought to be incentive compatible. We provide a series of tools, which may be used to determine the optimal unemployment insurance package of various societies.

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File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/cahiers/wp9904.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 9904.

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Length: 17
Date of creation: Apr 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Finances publiques, Finances privées, Bernard Jurion et Pierre Pestieau (éds.), Éditions de l'Université de Liège, 123-141, 2000.
Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9904

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Postal: P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station, Montreal (Canada) Quebec, H3C 3P8
Phone: (514) 987-4114
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Web page: http://www.uqam.ca/economie/
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Related research
Keywords: Unemployment; unemployment insurance; moral hazard; voting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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References listed on IDEAS
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  27. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1995. "The optimal level of unemployment insurance benefits in a model of employment mismatch," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 407-420, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  29. Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1998. "Voting on Unemployment Insurance Generosity," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 64, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
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