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Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Intensity and Precautionary Saving

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Author Info
James Costain

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Abstract

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a general equilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort when unemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchase capital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the asset accumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiring expenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies of unemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfare gains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectively through asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantially larger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfare impact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 243.

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Date of creation: Nov 1997
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:243

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Related research
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; matching; search effort; moral hazard; precautionary saving; prudence; life cycle;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. James S. Costain, 1998. "On the Quantitative Importance of Wage Bargaining Models," Economics Working Papers 262, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christopher D. Carroll & Andrew A. Samwick, 1995. "How Important is Precautionary Saving?," NBER Working Papers 5194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Christopher D. Carroll, 1992. "The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macroeconomic Evidence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1992-2), pages 61-156. [Downloadable!]
  4. Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, 1994. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Benefits on Layoffs Using Firm and Individual Data," NBER Working Papers 4960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1995. "The European unemployment dilemma," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues 95-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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  6. Deaton, Angus & Paxson, Christina, 1994. "Intertemporal Choice and Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Acemoglu, D. & Shimer, R., 1997. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Working papers 97-9, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  8. Eric M. Engen & Jonathan Gruber, 1995. "Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving," NBER Working Papers 5252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dale Mortensen, 1984. "Job Search and Labor Market Analysis," Discussion Papers 594, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Silvio Rendón, 2002. "Job Search And Asset Accumulation Under Borrowing Constraints," Economics Working Papers we025219, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Aiyagari, S Rao, 1994. "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 659-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. James S. Costain & Michael Reiter, 2003. "Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Calibration of Matching Models," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Andreas Pollak, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels," Labor and Demography 0409004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Silvio Rendon, 2002. "Job Search and Asset Accumulation under Borrowing Constraints," Economics Working Papers 649, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hamish Low & Costas Meghir & Luigi Pistaferri, 2006. "Wage risk and employment risk over the life cycle," IFS Working Papers W06/27, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Leon J.H. Bettendorf & D. Peter Broer, 2003. "Lifetime Labor Supply in a Search Model of Unemployment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-032/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  6. Burkhard Heer, 2000. "Employment And Welfare Effects Of A Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 3, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Assurance chômage et sociétés," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9904, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Heterogeneous Labor Markets and the Generosity Towards the Unemployed: An International Perspective," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 88, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  9. Raj Chetty, 2005. "A General Formula for the Optimal Level of Social Insurance," NBER Working Papers 11386, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Burkhard Heer, 2002. "Should Unemployment Benefits be Related to Previous Earnings?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. James S. Costain, 1998. "On the Quantitative Importance of Wage Bargaining Models," Economics Working Papers 262, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  12. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 1998:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Melvyn G. Coles & Adrian Masters, 2000. "Duration Dependent UI Payments in a Model of Equilibrium Unemployment," ILR working papers 059, Institute for Labour Research. [Downloadable!]
  14. Adrian Masters & Melvyn Coles, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 04-12, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Per Engström & Bertil Holmlund, 2005. "Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Thomas Crossley & Hamish Low, 2004. "When Might Unemployment Insurance Matter?," Department of Economics Working Papers 2004-04, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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