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Protecting the Unemployed in Chile: From State Assistance to Individual Insurance?

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Author Info
Castro-Fernandez, Rodriguo
Wodon, Quentin

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Abstract

The weaknesses of traditional policies for dealing with unemployment shocks have placed the reform of social insurance programs at the center of the public policy debate. Unemployment insurance saving accounts (UISAs) have been proposed as an instrument to protect workers from the loss in earnings associated with unemployment. The idea is to have all workers (and possibly their employers as well) deposit a share of their monthly incomes into their UISA, with the balance in the account accruing market interest rates. During an unemployment spell, the workers who would be eligible to do so could withdraw funds from their individual account. It is only when there would be no or few funds left in the account that complementary unemployment assistance allowances would be provided. The fact that the accounts are individualized helps to solve the moral hazard problem. Moreover, the fact that the contribution system is mandatory also helps to solve another problem, namely the adverse selection mechanisms through which only some workers might choose to self-insure, or through which the private insurance firms insuring workers would try to hand-pick those workers with the lowest risk of being unemployed. Overall, the objective of UISAs is to set incentives right. Recent proposals for replacing standard forms of unemployment assistance by UISAs are being implemented in several Latin American countries. This paper explores some of the implications of replacing in Chile the current job security system with UISAs.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15416.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15416

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Related research
Keywords: Chile; unemployment insurance savings account;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor

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  1. Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 1998. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts," NBER Working Papers 6860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-82, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B., 1998. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Papers 1998-2, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    Other versions:
  4. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 118-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Brown, Eleanor & Kaufold, Howard, 1988. "Human Capital Accumulation and the Optimal Level of Unemployment Insurance Provision," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 493-514, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. James Costain, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Intensity and Precautionary Saving," Economics Working Papers 243, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  8. Fernando Alvarez & Marcel Veracierto, 1998. "Search, self-insurance and job-security provisions," Working Paper Series WP-98-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
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  10. Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Heterogeneous Skills," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 54, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gruber, Jonathan, 1997. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 192-205, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Andolfatto, David & Gomme, Paul, 1996. "Unemployment insurance and labor-market activity in Canada," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 47-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. W. Henry Chiu & Edi Karni, 1998. "Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 806-827, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Zhang, G-J, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance Analysis in a Search Economy," Working Papers 1996-2, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
  15. Zhang, G-J, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance Analysis in a Search Economy," Working Papers 1996-2, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
  16. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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