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A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance

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Author Info
Chetty, Raj

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-4JKRTJ4-1/2/8f0e8c6f1bbaa193e7e87572c8f9d655
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 90 (2006)
Issue (Month): 10-11 (November)
Pages: 1879-1901
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:10-11:p:1879-1901

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin Feldstein, 2005. "Rethinking Social Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 1-24, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Moffitt, Robert, 1985. "Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 85-101, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-82, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Anderson, Patricia M & Meyer, Bruce D, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 913-37, August.
  5. Thomas Crossley & Hamish Low, 2005. "Borrowing constraints, the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance," IFS Working Papers W05/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Martin Browning & Thomas F. Crossley, 2004. "Shocks, stocks and socks: smoothing consumption over a temporary income loss," CAM Working Papers 2004-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jacob Mincer, 1962. "Labor Force Participation of Married Women," NBER Chapters, in: Aspects of Labor Economics, pages 63-106 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  8. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gruber, Jonathan, 1997. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 192-205, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Topel, Robert H, 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 541-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Martin Feldstein & James M. Poterba, 1984. "Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wages," NBER Working Papers 1011, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Cullen, Julie Berry & Gruber, Jonathan, 2000. "Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out Spousal Labor Supply?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 546-72, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jonathan Gruber, 1994. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 4750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Saez, Emmanuel, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 205-29, January.
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  18. James Costain, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Intensity and Precautionary Saving," Economics Working Papers 243, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  19. Martin Browning & Thomas Crossley, 1999. "Unemployment Insurance Benefit Levels and Consumption Changes," CEPR Discussion Papers 405, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2008. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Christian Keuschnigg, 2008. "Corporate Taxation and the Welfare State," Working Papers 0813, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Raj Chetty & Adam Looney, 2005. "Consumption Smoothing and the Welfare Consequences of Social Insurance in Developing Economies," NBER Working Papers 11709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Christian Keuschnigg & Evelyn Ribi, 2007. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-41, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robert Shimer & Iván Werning, 2006. "On the Optimal Timing of Benefits with Heterogeneous Workers and Human Capital Depreciation," NBER Working Papers 12230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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