Rethinking Social Insurance
AbstractThis paper begins by discussing the nature of and rationale for social insurance programs. I then consider three political principles and four economic principles that could guide the design and reform of social insurance programs. These ideas are then applied to unemployment insurance, Social Security pensions, health insurance and Medicare. A common theme is the advantage of incorporating investment based personal accounts in each of these programs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11250.
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Feldstein, Martin. "Rethinking Social Insurance," American Economic Review, 2005, v95(1,Mar), 1-24.
Note: EFG PE
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Other versions of this item:
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2005-04-09 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-04-09 (Public Economics)
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NBER Working Papers
5413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Feldstein, Martin, 1987. "Should Social Security Benefits Be Means Tested?," Scholarly Articles 2770498, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Raj Chetty, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance When Income Effects are Large," NBER Working Papers 10500, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-57, October.
- Feldstein, Martin S, 1974. "Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 905-26, Sept./Oct.
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