Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings
AbstractThis paper estimates a job search model with savings and determines optimal unemployment benefit policy for the estimated model. For observed and unobserved worker characteristics, the estimation strategy relates observed unemployment spell durations to the model implied unemployment hazard rate. The model is estimated on Danish unemployment spell data which include high quality wealth and income information. The estimation shows that Danish workers respond to changes in economic incentives in ways consistent with the model and that the magnitude of the effect of the responses on the unemployment hazard rate is small. Optimal unemployment benefit level policy is determined as a trade-off between providing insurance against consumption fluctuation and the moral hazard of reducing the worker's incentives to search back into employment. Given the estimated low level of moral hazard, the optimal benefit level is quite high even though workers can self-insure via savings. Depending on the interest rate which is effectively the cost of using savings as self-insurance, the optimal replacement rate ranges between 43% and 82%. The policy analysis emphasizes the importance of including transitional dynamics to avoid a significant downward bias associated with a simple steady state comparison analysis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics in its series CAM Working Papers with number 2004-10.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Rasmus Lentz, 2009. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(1), pages 37-57, January.
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth
- E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
- J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2004-09-05 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-IAS-2004-09-05 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2004-09-05 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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