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Voting on Unemployment Insurance

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Author Info

  • Pallage, Stephane
  • Zimmermann, Christian

Abstract

In this article, we ask heterogeneous agents in a dynamic general equilibrium economy to vote on the generosity of their unemployment insurance program. We observe the influence on their vote of (1) moral hazard, (2) private alternatives, and (3) changes in employment status. Agents differ in skills, employment probabilities, income prospects, and assets. For a calibration to the United States, we show that: (1) in contrast to the literature, plausible levels of moral hazard need not induce large cuts in optimal benefits. (2) Switching to private insurance is rejected for most status quo, though it would be as generous. (3) Skill groups vote as a block. For reasonable discount factors, solidarity is never broken simultaneously for more than one group.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 903-23
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:42:y:2001:i:4:p:903-23

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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. New insights on optimal unemployment insurance
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-12-23 12:36:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
  1. Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2004. "On Voters' Attitudes Towards Unemployment Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation," Working papers 2004-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  2. Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2007. "A Positive Theory of the Earnings Relationship of Unemployment Benefits," IZA Discussion Papers 3003, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Pallage, Stéphane & Scruggs, Lyle & Zimmermann, Christian, 2008. "Measuring Unemployment Insurance Generosity," IZA Discussion Papers 3868, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Niklas Potrafke, 2010. "Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 545-571, September.
  5. Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Assurance chômage et sociétés," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9904, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  6. Stéphane PALLAGE & Lyle SCRUGGS & Christian ZIMMERMANN, 2009. "Unemployment Insurance Generosity: A Transatlantic Comparison," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 95-96, pages 15-23.
  7. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2009. "A Positive Theory of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 7333, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Hassler, J. & Mora, J.V.R. & Storesletten, K. & Zilibotti, F., 1999. "Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance," Papers 665, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  9. Andreas Pollak, 2005. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Voting," Computational Economics 0505002, EconWPA.
  10. Pollak, Andreas, 2007. "Optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 2029-2053, November.

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