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Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Voting

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Author Info
Andreas Pollak (University of Freiburg)

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Abstract

The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme and the voting behaviour on unemployment policy reforms. In a first step, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio UI systems are obtained in simulations. Then, the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be approved by a majority of the voters is explored. Finally, the transitional dynamics following a policy change are analysed. Accounting for this transition has an important influence on the voting outcome.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/comp/papers/0505/0505002.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Computational Economics with number 0505002.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 12 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:0505002

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: insurance; heterogeneous agents; job search; voting; human capital;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Burkhard Heer, 2003. "Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 147-168, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Pallage, Stephane & Zimmermann, Christian, 2001. "Voting on Unemployment Insurance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 903-23, November.
  3. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 118-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2006. "On voters’ attitudes towards unemployment insurance subsidies across regions: a Canadian simulation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 391-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
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  7. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1993. "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving," Working Papers 502, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Huggett, Mark, 1993. "The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 17(5-6), pages 953-969. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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