On voters’ attitudes towards unemployment insurance subsidies across regions: a Canadian simulation
AbstractThe Canadian unemployment insurance program is designed to reflect the varying risk of joblessness across regions. Regions that are considered low-risk areas subsidize higher risk ones. A region's risk is typically proxied by its relative unemployment rate. We use a dynamic, heterogeneous-agent model calibrated to Canada to analyze voters preferences between a uniformly generous unemployment insurance and the current system with asymmetric generosity. We find that Canada's unusual unemployment insurance system is surprisingly close to what voters would choose in spite of the possibilities of moral hazard and self-insurance through asset build-up.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Other versions of this item:
- Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2004. "On Voters' Attitudes Towards Unemployment Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation," Working papers 2004-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle
by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2010-12-17 11:01:01
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