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Quel impact pour les taxis si la loi supprimait toute différence règlementaire entre taxis et VTC ?

Author

Listed:
  • Romain Biard

    (Université de Bourgogne-Franche Comté, LMB UMR 6623)

  • Marc Deschamps

    (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

Le numérique et plus particulièrement l'usage de téléphones mobiles multifonctions (i.e smartphones ) ainsi que l'existence de plateformes sont des modifications majeures, notamment, du marché du transport payant de personnes individuelles. Actuellement la loi française réserve aux taxis le monopole du stationnement sur la chaussée, le maraudage (c'est-à-dire la possibilité d'être hélés sur la voie publique) et le stationnement dédié dans une station située aux abords d'un aéroport, d'une gare ou d'un carrefour urbain. Cet article vise à présenter un essai de modélisation simple de la façon dont les taxis pourraient être financièrement impactés par l'arrivée de nouveaux concurrents dans le cas où la loi viendrait supprimer toute distinction entre les taxis et les VTC (Voiture de Transport avec Chauffeur). Nous distinguons le cas où à chaque pas de temps il y aurait une (ou plusieurs) arrivée(s) certaine (s) de concurrent(s) identique(s) ou distinct(s) des concurrents installés, et le cas où il y aurait à chaque pas temps une (ou plusieurs) arrivée(s) aléatoire (s) de concurrent(s) identique(s) ou distinct(s) des concurrents installés. Cet exercice nous semble intéressant notamment dans l'éventualité où l'on envisagerait de prendre la décision politique de racheter les licences de taxis, mais aussi pour identifier à partir de quel niveau d'augmentation de la demande généré par un tel changement légal celui-ci serait sans effet sur les gains des taxis.

Suggested Citation

  • Romain Biard & Marc Deschamps, 2020. "Quel impact pour les taxis si la loi supprimait toute différence règlementaire entre taxis et VTC ?," Working Papers 2020-03, CRESE.
    • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2021. "Dynamic Equilibrium with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 242-269, June.

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