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A Measure for Credibility: Tracking US Monetary Developments

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  • Demertzis, Maria
  • Marcellino, Massimiliano
  • Viegi, Nicola

Abstract

Our objective is to identify a way of checking empirically the extent to which expectations are de-coupled from inflation, how well they might be anchored in the long run, and at what level. This methodology allows us then to identify a measure for the degree of anchorness, and as anchored expectations are associated with credibility, this will serve as a proxy for credibility. We apply this methodology to the US history of inflation since 1963 and examine how well our measure tracks the periods for which credibility is known to be either low or high. Of particular interest to the validity of the measure is the start of the Great Moderation. Following the narrative of a number of well documented incidents in this period, we check how well our measure captures both the evolution of credibility in US monetary policy, as well as reactions to inflation scares.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7036.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7036

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Keywords: anchors for expectations; credibility; Great Inflation; Great Moderation;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Timo Henckel & Gordon D. Menzies & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2013. "The Great Recession and the Two Dimensions of European Central Bank Credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2013-55, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  2. Scott Davis, 2012. "The Effect of Commodity Price Shocks on Underlying Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Credibility," Working Papers 272012, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  3. Kliem, Martin & Kriwoluzky, Alexander & Sarferaz, Samad, 2013. "On the low-frequency relationship between public deficits and inflation," Discussion Papers 12/2013, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  4. Galvão, Ana Beatriz C & Marcellino, Massimiliano, 2010. "Endogenous Monetary Policy Regimes and the Great Moderation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Todd E. Clark & Troy Davig, 2008. "An empirical assessment of the relationships among inflation and short- and long-term expectations," Research Working Paper RWP 08-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  6. Malikane, Christopher & Mokoka, Tshepo, 2012. "Monetary policy credibility: A Phillips curve view," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 266-271.
  7. Serkan ÇİÇEK & Cüneyt AKAR & Eray YÜCEL, 2011. "Türkiye’de enflasyon beklentilerinin çapalanması ve güvenilirlik," Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, Bilgesel Yayincilik, vol. 26(304), pages 37-55.

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