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Unemployment Compensation Finance and Labour Market Rigidity

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Author Info
Cahuc, Pierre
Malherbet, Franck

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Abstract

The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the US unemployment benefit system. In most states, unemployment benefits are financed by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. Experience rating is a way to require employers to contribute to the payment of unemployment benefits they create through their firing decisions. It is striking that experience rating is absent from the unemployment compensation systems of other OECD countries, where benefits are usually financed by taxes on payrolls, paid by employers or employees, and by government contributions (Holmlund, 1998). Is experience rating only adapted to the US labour market? Would it be suitable in other countries? At first glance, it is likely that experience rating is not desirable in many European labour markets characterized by high firing costs. We provide a simple matching model of a rigid labour market including firing costs, temporary jobs and a minimum wage in order to analyse this issue. Our analysis leads us to argue that experience rating is likely to reduce unemployment and to improve the welfare of low skilled workers in France, and more generally for low skilled workers in a typical rigid Continental European labour market.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3512.

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Date of creation: Aug 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3512

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Related research
Keywords: job protection; matching models; unemployment benefits;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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  1. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2005. "Optimum Income Taxation and Layoff Taxes," IZA Discussion Papers 1678, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbe, Franck, 2008. "Employment protection reform in search economies," Les Cahiers de Recherche 910, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Javier Ortega & Laurence Rioux, 2008. "On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation," CEP Discussion Papers dp0846, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Pierre Cahuc & Stéphane Carcillo, 2007. "The Shortcomings of a Partial Release of Employment Protection Laws: The Case of the 2005 French Reform," IMF Working Papers 06/301, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. R.A. de Mooij, 2004. "Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Memoranda 100, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jian-Ping Zhou, 2006. "Reforming Employment Protection Legislation in France," IMF Working Papers 06/108, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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