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Borrowing From Employees: Wage Dynamics With Financial Constraints

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  • Vicenzo Quadrini

    ()

  • Claudio Michelacci

    ()
    (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)

Abstract

We analyze how the financial conditions of the firm affect the compensation structure of workers, the size of the firm, and its dynamics. Firms that are financially constrained offer long-term wage contracts characterized by an increasing wage profile, that is,they pay lower wages today in exchange of higher future wages, effectively borrowing form their employees. Because constrained firms also operate at a suboptimal scale, which then increases gradually over time, we have that younger and smaller firms grow faster and pay lower wages.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEMFI in its series Working Papers with number wp2005_0501.

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Date of creation: Jan 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2005_0501

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Keywords: Investment financing; long-term contracts; wages.;

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References

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  1. Rui Albuquerque & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2002. "Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics," RCER Working Papers 493, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J & Garrett, Mario D, 1990. "Insider Power in Wage Determination," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(226), pages 143-70, May.
  3. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," NBER Working Papers 10132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Brown, Charles & Medoff, James, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1027-59, October.
  5. Thomas F. Cooley & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2001. "Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1286-1310, December.
  6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1991/233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  7. Nickell, S. & Nicolitsas, D., 1995. "How Does Financial Pressure Affect Firms," Economics Series Working Papers 99170, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Michelacci, Claudio & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2005. "Financial Markets and Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 4867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Oi, Walter Y. & Idson, Todd L., 1999. "Firm size and wages," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2165-2214 Elsevier.
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  12. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Ceron, Jose A. & Suarez, Javier, 2006. "Hot and Cold Housing Markets: International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Beatriz Dominguez & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2006. "R&D In The Pharmaceutical Industry: A World Of Small Innovation," Working Papers wp2006_0601, CEMFI.
  3. Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2010. "Credit within the Firm," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/16, European University Institute.
  4. Torben Klarl & Alfred Maussner, 2010. "Firm Heterogeneity, Credit Constraints, and Endogenous Growth," Discussion Paper Series 311, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  5. Schnabel, Claus & Kohaut, Susanne & Brixy, Udo, 2008. "Employment stability of entrants in newly founded firms: a matching approach using linked employer-employee data from Germany," Discussion Papers 56, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  6. Díaz-Giménez, Javier & Pijoan-Mas, Josep, 2006. "Flat Tax Reforms in the US: A Boon for the Income Poor," CEPR Discussion Papers 5812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Claus Schnabel & Susanne Kohaut & Udo Brixy, 2011. "Employment stability in newly founded firms: a matching approach using linked employer–employee data from Germany," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 85-100, January.
  8. Aleix Calveras & Juan José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2005. "Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?," Economics Working Papers 935, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Jan Zabojnik, 2014. "Stock-based Compensation Plans and Employee Incentives," Working Papers 1325, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

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