Better-Reply Strategies with Bounded Recall
AbstractA decision maker (an agent) is engaged in a repeated interaction with Nature. The objective of the agent is to guarantee to himself the long-run average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to Nature?s empirical distribution of play, no matter what Nature does. An agent with perfect recall can achieve this objective by a simple better-reply strategy. In this paper we demonstrate that the relationship between perfect recall and bounded recall is not straightforward: An agent with bounded recall may fail to achieve this objective, no matter how long recall he has and no matter what better-reply strategy he employs.
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- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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