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Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case

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Dov Samet
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000536.

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Date of creation: 27 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000536

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry, 2005. "Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle," Discussion Paper Series dp393, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Department of Economics 97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-5.

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