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Tests in contingency tables as regression tests Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Stanislav Anatolyev ()
Grigory Kosenok (New Economic School)
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Applied researchers often use tests based on contingency tables in preliminary data analysis and diagnostic testing. We show that many of such tests may be alternatively implemented by testing for coecient restrictions in linear regression systems (as a rule, employing the Wald test). This uni es the theories of regression analysis and contingency tables, sheds more light on intuitive contents of contingency table tests, and provides a more convenient and familiar tool for practitioners.
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Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number
w0075.
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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0075Contact details of provider: Postal: 117418 Russia, Moscow, Nakhimovsky pr., 47, office 720 Phone: +7 (495) 105 50 02 Fax: +7 (495) 105 50 03 Email: Web page: http://www.cefir.ru More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Contingency table Linear regression 2-test Wald test Ranks Find related papers by JEL classification: C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Hypothesis Testing C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Other Model Applications
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