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Inverse Campaigning

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  • Kai A. Konrad

Abstract

It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 905.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_905

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Keywords: inverse campaigning; information; voting; policy design;

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  1. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Hess, Gregory D., 1996. "A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-229, December.
  2. Glazer, A. & Konrad, K., 1991. "The Evaluation Of Risky Projects By Voters," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 90-91-13, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  3. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & Vries, C. de, 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
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  7. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
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Cited by:
  1. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2012. "Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 20-32.
  2. Michael Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper Vries, 2012. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 315-350, October.
  3. Konrad, Kai Andreas & Kovenock, Daniel J., 2005. "Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2005-14, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  4. Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 1228, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Jan K. Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 2013. "Negative Campaigning in a Probabilistic Voting Model," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 4233, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Salvatore Barbaro & Jens Suedekum, 2009. "Voting on income tax exemptions," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 239-253, January.
  7. Seel, Christian, 2013. "The Value of Information in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association 79930, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  8. van Wijnbergen, Sweder & Willems, Tim, 2014. "Learning dynamics and support for economic reforms : why good news can be bad," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 6973, The World Bank.
  9. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2005. "The Interaction of Tax Exemptions and Individual Tax Reform Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1543, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2006. "Reforming a complicated income tax system: The political economy perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-59, March.

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