The Evaluation Of Risky Projects By Voters
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 90-91-13.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1991
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
elections ; policy making;
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- Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 524-540.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2002.
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance
FS IV 02-29, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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